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Abstract
This paper characterizes the testable implications of stability for aggregate match-
ings. We consider data on matchings where individuals are aggregated, based on their
observable characteristics, into types, and we know how many agents of each type match.
We derive stability conditions for an aggregate matching, and, based on these, provide
a simple necessary and sufficient condition for an observed aggregate matching to be
rationalizable (i.e. such that preferences can be found so that the observed aggregate
matching is stable). Subsequently, we derive moment inequalities based on the stabil-
ity conditions, and provide an empirical illustration using the cross-sectional marriage
distributions across the US states.
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1 Introduction
The literature on stable matching has grown rapidly, but as a positive empirical theory,
stable matchings are still not well understood. There are many advancements and re-
finements in the theoretical literature, and many normative applications of the theory
to real-world matching markets. Positive empirical studies of matching, however, have
lagged behind. This is due to three difficulties in deriving observable implications of the
theory. The first is a pure dimensionality constraint; many real-world matching markets
(such as marriage or housing markets) are huge, featuring hundreds of thousands or mil-
lions of individuals on each side of the markets. Most of the theoretical matching models,
which are formulated at the individual-level, quickly become intractable at these large
dimensions. The second is an indeterminacy in the direction of revealed preference: if
Alice matches with Bob and not with Bruce, we cannot know if Alice prefers Bob over
Bruce, or if Bruce is unavailable to Alice because he prefers his partner to matching with
Alice. The third difficulty is that the theory imposes no restriction on a single match-
ing: one would need to observe different matchings involving the same agents. Multiple
observations of different matchings among the same agents are not realistic.
We present one solution to these difficulties. One can aggregate the observed match-
ings into cells, where the individuals on each side of the market are summed up into cells
on the basis of their observed characteristics. Indeed, often data on matching markets is
simply not available at the individual level, for privacy concerns, among other reasons,
and most empirical studies of marriage matching use aggregate level data. What restric-
tions on these aggregate matchings are implied by the individual-level matching models?
This is the motivating question of this paper.
∗Echenique thanks the Lee Center at Caltech, and the NSF, for funding related to this project.
We find that the theory has very strong implications for aggregate matchings. This
may explain why most of the existing empirical literature works with aggregate match-
ings. The empirical literature also often assumes that agents can make monetary transfers
(transferable utility; hereafter TU). Our results are the first deriving the complete ob-
servable implications of stability for aggregate matchings: We characterize the observable
implications of the models with transfers, and without. It turns out that both models
imply strong empirical restrictions, but the theory is strictly more restrictive when trans-
fers are possible. Our results explain, in a sense, why aggregate matchings and transfers
have been useful for empirical studies.
We develop an econometric approach for estimating preferences from observed aggre-
gate matchings. Our approach is based on moment inequalities obtained from imposing
stability on the data. We develop our estimation technique under the assumption that
agents cannot make transfers. In light of the second difficulty mentioned above, this is
the most challenging case, and we believe it is realistic for many matching markets. Once
transfers between individuals are ruled out, however, multiple stable matchings become
a generic feature, which raises important difficulties for the econometric estimation of
preferences from observed matching data. We show how the econometric technique can
be used by presenting an empirical application to aggregate marriage data.
1.1 General motivation. Discrete choice theory is based on the idea that revealed
preferences are unambiguous: if an agent chooses A when B is available then the utility
of A is higher than the utility of B. In contrast, in two-sided choice problems, revealed
preferences are ambiguous. An agent may choose A over B even when she regards B as
the better choice; the reason is that B has a say in the matter, and B may prefer some
other choice over matching with the agent. Thus, in a two-sided model, preferences and
allocations determine “budgets” endogenously: an agent can only choose among options
that are willing to match with the agent, given who their partners are.
For empirical work, the two-sided nature of choices presents a unique challenge. One
cannot take choices as given and infer preferences. There is a fundamental simultaneity
that must be dealt with, where preferences determine the sets of willing partners (“bud-
gets”), and these sets in turn determine the direction of revealed preferences. Most of
the literature deals with the problem by assuming transferable utility, so that matchings
maximize total surplus. We tackle the problem directly, in an non-transferable utility
model. Our econometric technique is based on deriving a moment inequality from the
stability constraints, this technique is quite different from the methods based on discrete
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choice.
1.2 Related literature. Our paper is close in focus to several other recent papers
exploring the empirics of matching markets. These papers can roughly be divided into
those in which NTU is assumed, and those in which TU is assumed.
A matching model under TU is equivalent to the Shapley and Shubik (1971) assign-
ment game. A stable matching is one which maximizes the sum of the joint surplus of
all matched couples. This is the setup considered in Choo and Siow (2006) and Galichon
and Salanie (2009), who consider identification and estimation of TU matching models.
Specifically, Choo and Siow derive and estimate an aggregate matching model using mar-
riage cross-sections from the UC Census. Assuming independent logit preferences shocks
at the individual level, and a continuum of men and women, they derive a “marriage
matching function” of the form:
Πij = xij/
√
xi0xj0
where Πij is (half of the) total surplus from a match between a type-i man to a type-j
woman. xij are the number such marriages observed, and xi0 and xj0 are, respectively, the
number of single type-i men and type-j women. For the empirical work, they recover the
surplus Πij given the observations of the x’s. They do this for two aggregate matchings:
one from the early 1970’s, and another from the early 1980’s. Subsequently, they use
their results to explore the dramatic fall in marriage rates between the 1970’s and the
1980’s and, strikingly, they find that the legalization of abortion can explain about 20%
of this drop.
Fox (2007) considers individual-level TU matching models, and develops a maximum-
score estimator for these models based on a “pairwise stability” requirement, which im-
plies that, if an observed matching is stable, then no two pairs of agents should profitably
be able to swap their partners. (This condition may not hold for stable matchings in NTU
settings.) When the matching markets are big, such a comparison of all the pairwise sta-
bility conditions becomes infeasible. Fox shows that only a subset of the inequalities need
to be used in the estimation, so long as a “rank-order” property holds. Subsequently,
Bajari and Fox (2008) apply this estimator to analyze the efficiency of allocations in
wireless spectrum auctions run by the FCC.
In the NTU setting, Dagsvik (2000) considers the question of inferring preferences
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from aggregate matching data. Like Choo-Siow, he assumes independent logit-distributed
preference shocks at the individual level. Assuming large number of agents (his results
are asymptotic in the number of men and women of each type), Dagsvik derives an
equilibrium equation, where the supply of matches of a certain type must equal the
demand. His aggregate matching function is
cij =
xij
xi0xj0
; cij ≡ aijbji
where aij and bji are, respectively, the deterministic portion of the utility a type-i man
gets from a type-j woman, and vice versa, which is very similar to the Choo-Siow match-
ing function, obtained from a TU setting.
Echenique (2008) studies the sets of matchings that can be rationalized as being
stable. The focus is on repeated observations of stable individual matchings, not on
aggregate matchings.
Hitsch, Hortac¸su, and Ariely (2006) also work in the NTU model, but they employ a
dataset from an online dating service to estimate preferences separately from the process
of matching. Then they use the estimated preferences to simulate the men- and women-
optimal matchings, and compare these optimal matchings to the actual matches observed
from the dataset.
2 The Model
2.1 Preliminary definitions. An (undirected) graph is a pair G = (V,E), where V
is a set and E is a subset of V ×V . A path in G is a sequence p = 〈x0, . . . xN〉 such that
for n ∈ {0, . . . N − 1}, (xn, xn+1) ∈ E. We write x ∈ p to denote that x is a vertex in p.
A path 〈x0, . . . xN〉 connects the vertices x0 and xN . A path 〈x0, . . . xN〉 is minimal if
there is no proper subsequence of 〈x0, . . . xN〉 that is also a path connecting the vertices
x0 and xN .
A cycle in G is a path c = 〈x0, . . . xN〉 with x0 = xN . A cycle is minimal if for
any two vertices xn and xn′ in c, the paths in c from xn to xn′ , and from xn′ to xn, are
minimal. Say that x and y are adjacent in c if there is n such that xn = x and xn+1 = y
or xn = y and xn+1 = x.
If c and c′ are two cycles, and there is a path from a vertex of c to a vertex of c′, then
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we say that c and c′ are connected .
An aggregate matching market is described by a triple 〈M,W,>〉, where:
1. M and W are disjoint, finite sets. We call the elements of M types of men and
the elements of W types of women .
2. >= ((>m)m∈M , (>w)w∈W ) is a profile of strict preferences: for each m and w, >m
is a linear order over W ∪ {m} and >w is a linear order over M ∪ {w}.
We call agents on one side men, and on the other side women, as is traditional in the
matching literature. Many applications are, of course, to environments different from the
marriage matching market.
Consider an aggregate matching market 〈M,W,>〉, with M = {m1, . . . ,mK} and
W = {w1, . . . , wL}. An aggregate matching is a K × L matrix X = (Xij) with non-
negative integer entries. The interpretation of X is that Xij is the number of type-i men
and type-j women matched to each other. An aggregate matching X is canonical if
Xij ∈ {0, 1}. A canonical matching X is a simple matching if for each i there is at
most one j with Xij = 1, and for each j there is at most one i with Xij = 1. The standard
theory of stable matchings studies simple matchings (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990).
An aggregate matching X is individually rational if Xij > 0 implies that wj>mimi
and mi >wj wj. A pair of types (mi, wj) is a blocking pair for X if there are wl ∈ W
with Xil > 0, and mk ∈ M with Xkj > 0, such that wj >mi wl and mi >wj mk. An
aggregate matching X is stable if it is individually rational and there are no blocking
pairs for X.
For any aggregate matching X, we can construct a canonical aggregate matching Xc
by setting Xcij = 0 when Xij = 0 and X
c
ij = 1 when Xij > 0. The following is obvious:
Proposition 1. An aggregate matching X is stable if and only if Xc is stable.
Based on this observation, our theoretical results focus on canonical aggregate stable
matching.
2.2 Stability conditions. Given a matching market 〈M,W,>〉, we can construct a
graph (V,E) by letting V be the set of pairs (i, j), i = 1, . . . , N and j = 1, . . . , K. Define
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E by ((i, j), (k, l)) ∈ E if either wl >mi wj and mi >wl mk or wj >mk wl and mk >wj mi.
Then X is stable if and only if
((i, j), (k, l)) ∈ E ⇒ XijXkl = 0. (1)
In what follows, we will also make use of the contrapositive to the above statement.
Given a canonical matching X, we define an antiedge as a pair of couples (i, j), (k, l)
with i 6= k ∈M ; j 6= l ∈W such that Xij = Xkl = 1. Then, (1) is equivalent to:
(ij), (kl) is anti-edge ⇒
{
1(wl >mi wj) · 1(mi >wl mk) = 0
1(wj >mk wl) · 1(mk >wj mi) = 0
(2)
In our econometric approach below (Section 4), the contrapositive statement (2) of the
stability conditions forms the basis for the moment inequalities.
In this section, we use the graph (V,E) to understand stable matchings for given
preferences. In the proof of Theorem 7 of Section 3, we use it to infer preferences such
that a given matching is stable. For an example, consider the matching market with
three types of men and women, and preferences described as follows.
>m1 >m2 >m3 >w1 >w2 >w3
w1 w2 w3 m2 m3 m1
w2 w3 w1 m3 m1 m2
w3 w1 w2 m1 m2 m3
The resulting graph can be represented as follows.
1
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
1 1
1
NNN
NNN
NNN
NNN
NN 1

1
1 1 1,
where each vertex is indicated with a number 1. The requirement of stability translates
into sets of vertexes that must be 0. For example, applying (1) we find that the following
two matrices are stable matchings:
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0..
..
..
..
..
..
..
1 0
1
NNN
NNN
NNN
NNN
NN 1

1
0 1 0


1
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
1 1
1
NNN
NNN
NNN
NNN
NN 0

1
1 0 0


2.3 Remarks.
2.3.1 Aggregate matchings are not simple. We show that the testable implications of
aggregate stable matchings differs from those of simple stable matchings. In particular,
it is tempting to view an aggregate matching as a combination, or the coexistence, of a
collection of underlying stable single matchings. This view would be incorrect, as there
are additional restrictions imposed when one aggregates.
Consider the following example.
Example 2. Let 〈M,W,>〉 be an aggregate matching market with M = {m1,m2,m3},
W = {w1, w2, w3}, and where preferences are defined as follows:
m1 m2 m3
w1 w2 w3
w2 w3 w1
w3 w1 w2
w1 w2 w3
m2 m3 m1
m3 m1 m2
m1 m2 m3
Meaning that m2 ranks w2 first, followed by w3, and so on.
The following simple matchings are stable:
X1 =

 1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1

 X2 =

 0 0 11 0 0
0 1 0


Consider the sum of X1 and X2:
Xˆ = X1 +X2 =

 1 0 11 1 0
0 1 1

 .
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One might want to conclude that Xˆ is stable because it corresponds to the simultaneous
matching of agents through X1 and X2. Note, however, that Xˆ is not a stable aggregate
matching. The pair (m1, w2) is a blocking pair: we have that w2 >m1 w3 and m1 >w2 m2
while Xˆ13 > 0 and Xˆ22 > 0. One cannot view aggregate stable matchings by their
decomposition into simple stable matchings.1
This example also shows that an aggregate matching cannot be interpreted as a
“fractional” solution to the stability constraints in the linear programming formulation
of stable matchings (Vande Vate, 1989; Teo and Sethuraman, 1998). Here 1
2
Xˆ is a
fractional stable matching; but does not correspond to an aggregate stable matching. A
similar phenomenon arises with lotteries over matchings and ex-ante stability, see Kesten
and U¨nver (2009).
Put differently, the testable implications of stability for aggregate matchings cannot
be reduced to stability for a collection of simple matchings. There are “cross restrictions”
that need to be dealt with; in the example these take the form of instances of m1 and w2
who block in a way that is not present in any of the stable simple matchings.
In Section 4.3 we show further how simple disaggregate matchings do not generate
empirical implications with traction at the aggregate level.
2.3.2 Single Agents.We have assumed that there are no single agents, but assumption just
serves to simplify our notations. We can imagine that, for example, there is ni >
∑
j Xi,j
men of type i, and that ni−
∑
j Xi,j of them are single. Our model and results are easily
adaptable to this case: One would work with a matrix that has an additional row and
column, say i∗ and j∗. Then Xi,j∗ would represent the men of type i who are single;
simple adaptations of the results in Section 3 go through.
2.4 The structure of aggregate stable matchings. Let X and X ′ be aggregate
matchings. Say that X dominates X ′ if, for any i and j, Xij = 0 implies that X
′
ij = 0.
The following result is immediate from the definition of a stable aggregate matching.
Proposition 3. Let X be a stable aggregate matching. If X ′ is an aggregate matching,
and X dominates X ′, then X ′ is stable.
Thus, given an aggregate matching market 〈M,W,>〉, there is a family of maximal
1The conclusion is reinforced by the results of Section 2.4, where we show that the structure of
aggregate stable matchings differs from the lattice structure of simple stable matchings.
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stable matchings X : this family describes all the stable matchings, as a matching is
stable if and only if it is dominated by a member of X .
The members of X may have different cardinalities (see Example 12 in Section A),
so X does not necessarily have a matroid structure. It is nevertheless straightforward to
give an algorithm that, given a matching market 〈M,W,>〉, computes the set X , and
thus finds all the aggregate stable matchings. We proceed to describe the algorithm.
Consider the graph (V,E) associated to 〈M,W,>〉. Enumerate the vertices, V =
{1, 2, . . . N}. Start with the matching X0 that is identically zero. For v ∈ V , given the
matching Xv−1, define Xv to be identical to Xv−1 except possibly at entry v. Let entry
v be 1 if that does not violate condition (1); let entry v be 0 otherwise. Let X = XN .
The algorithm constructs an aggregate stable matching, as each Xv is an aggregate
stable matching. To see that it is maximal, let Xˆ 6= X be an aggregate matching that
dominates X. Let v be a vertex in V such that the entry corresponding to v in X is
0 and the entry in Xˆ is 1. By definition of Xv, there must be some entry v′ such that
(v, v′) ∈ E and entry v′ in Xv is 1. The entry v′ must be 1 in Xˆ, as Xˆ dominates X and
X dominates Xv. Then Xˆ is not stable because it violates condition (1).
We end this section with a partial result on the structure of X . One may wonder
when X coincides with the simple stable matching for market 〈M,W,>〉. We show that,
typically, X contains non-simple matchings.
Proposition 4. Let X be an individual stable matching. K = |M | (L = |W |) is the
number of types of men (women).
1. If K = L = 3 then X is not a maximal stable matching.
2. If K > 3, L > 3 and X is a maximal stable matching, then one of the following
two possibilities must hold:
(a) For all (i, j), the submatching X−(i,j) is a maximal stable matching in the
−(i, j) submarket.
(b) There is (h, l) with Xhl = 1, and a maximal stable matching x˜, for which
x˜h,j = x˜i,l = 0 for all i and j.
Note that (2) together with (1) is meant to suggest a recursive idea. When K = L =
4, (2a) cannot be true so we must have a matched pair in X that is nevertheless “totally
single” in another maximal stable matching.
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3 Rationalizing Aggregate Matchings.
We suppose that we observe an aggregate matching, and ask when there are preferences
that can rationalize it as a stable matching. The property is related to how many entries
in the matching matrix are non-zero. Specifically, we consider the graph formed by
connecting any two non-zero elements of the matrix, as long as they lie on the same row
or column. It turns out that rationalizable of an aggregate matching depends on the
number and connectedness of minimal cycles on this graph. We consider the NTU and
TU cases in turn.
3.1 Without transfers. Let M = {m1, . . . ,mK} and W = {w1, . . . , wL} be sets of
types of men and women. We write i and j for typical types of men and women, and il
and jk for specific types of men and women.
We suppose that we are given an aggregate matching X, and we want to understand
when there are preferences for the different types of men and women, such that X is a
stable aggregate matching. Say that a canonical matching X is rationalizable if there
exists a preference profile >= ((>m)m∈M , (>w)w∈W ) such that X is a stable aggregate
matching in 〈M,W,>〉.
We present first a simple result, showing that a rationalizable matrix must be rela-
tively sparse: it cannot have too many non-zero elements. Proposition 5 is subsumed in
Theorem 7, but it has a simple and intuitive proof so we choose to present it here.
Proposition 5. If X has a 3 × 2 or a 2 × 3 submatrix that is identically 1, then X is
not a stable aggregate matching for any preference profile.
Proof. We may assume that X is the submatrix in question. Suppose X is stable. By
individual rationality, for all men any woman is preferable to being single. Similarly for
the women. We must find a pair (i, j) such that wj is not last in mi’s preference, and
mi is not last in wj’s preferences. Finding this pair suffices because then there is k and
l with Xik = 1 and Xlj = 1 and wj >mi wk, mi >wj ml. Say that m1 ranks w1 last. If
either w2 or w3 rank m1 as not-last, then we are done. If both w2 and w3 rank m1 last
then consider m2: m2 must rank one of w2 and w3 as not-last. Since they rank m1 last
then we are done.
Remark 6. If K = L = 2 then the matching X that is identically 1 is stable for the
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preferences
>m1 >m2 >w1 >w2
w1 w2 m2 m1
w2 w1 m1 m2
Fix a matching X. We use the graph defined by the 1-entries in X, where there
is an edge between two entries in the same row, and an edge between two entries in
the same column. Formally, consider the graph (V, L) for which the set of vertices is
V := {(i, j)|i ∈ M, j ∈ W such that Xij = 1}, and there is an edge ((i, j), (k, l)) ∈ L if
i = k or j = l.
The main result of the paper is Theorem 7, a characterization of the rationalizable
aggregate matchings. The proof of the sufficiency direction is constructive; it works by
using an algorithm to construct a rationalizing preference profile. The construction is not
universal, in the sense that some rationalizing preference profiles cannot be constructed
using the algorithm (see Example 13).
To simplify the statement and proof of the theorem, we assume that there are no
single men or women. Similar arguments apply to the case when some agents may be
single.2
Theorem 7. An aggregate matching X is rationalizable if and only if the associated
graph (V, L) does not contain two connected distinct minimal cycles.
The following example illustrates the condition in the theorem.
Example 8 (minimal cycle). Let X be

 1 1 10 1 1
1 1 0

 .
2Add a column js and a row is to X. Let Xi,js be the number of type i men who are single and Xis,j
the number of type j women who are single. A result similar to Theorem 7 holds for this augmented
matrix.
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The graph (V, L) can be represented as
1 1 1
0 1 1
1 1 0
The following is an example of two minimal cycles that are connected.
1 1 1
0 1 1
1 1 0
1 1 1
0 1 1
1 1 0
3.2 With transfers. So far, we have focused on the NTU model. In this section, we
explore the empirical implications of transfers vis-a-vis the result in Theorem 7. We
show that if agents can make transfers, then stability has strictly more empirical bite
than when transfers are not present: any aggregate matching that is rationalizable with
transfers is also rationalizable without transfers.3
The model of matching with transfers was first introduced by Shapley and Shubik
(1971), and applied to the problem of marriage by Becker (1973). A pair of men and
women (m,w) generate a surplus αm,w ∈ R if they match. The stable matchings are the
ones that maximize the total sum of match surplus.
For an aggregate matching X, we suppose that a type i man who matches with a type
j woman can generate a surplus αi,j ∈ R. So the surplus generated by the matchings of
types i and j in X is Xi,jαi,j. The information on surpluses is given by a matrix
α = (αi,j)|M |×|W |.
Now, in familiar “revealed preference” fashion we ask when, given X, there is a matrix
3This contrasts sharply with the results on rationalizing a collection of simple matchings. Chambers
and Echenique (2009) show that there are sets of matchings that are rationalizable with transfers but
not without transfers, and vice versa.
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α such that X is stable for the surpluses in α.
Formally, let X be an aggregate matching. Say that X is TU-rationalizable by a
matrix of surplus α if X is the unique solution to the following problem.
maxX˜
∑
i,j αi,jX˜i,j
s.t.

∀j
∑
i X˜i,j =
∑
iXi,j
∀i ∑j X˜i,j =∑j Xi,j
(3)
Remark 9. We restrict X˜ in (3) to have the same number of agents of each type as X.
The restriction is obviously needed, as one could otherwise generate high surplus by re-
classifying agents into high-surplus types. Essentially, we consider situations where the
number of agents of each type is given, and we focus on how they match.
Note also that we require X to be the unique maximizer in (3). There is a clear
contrast with Section 3, where we did not require that X was the unique stable matching.
This difference is inevitable, though. If we instead would require X to be only one of the
maximizers of (3), then any matching can be rationalized. In a sense, without transfers
multiplicity is unavoidable (only very strong conditions ensure a unique stable matching),
while uniqueness in the TU model holds for almost all real matrices α.
Theorem 10. An aggregate matching X is TU-rationalizable if and only if the associated
graph (V, L) contains no minimal cycles.4
Corollary 11. If an aggregate matching X is TU-rationalizable, then it is rationalizable.
4 Empirical implementation
Starting in this section, we consider how to estimate agents’ preferences from observed
aggregate matchings. Throughout, we assume the following parameterized preferences:
uij = Zijβ + εij, (4)
where uij denotes the utility received by a type i individual if he/she matches with a
type j individual. Zij is a vector of observed covariates; β is the vector of parameters
we want to estimate; and εij denotes unobserved components of utility. In the empirical
4A graph contains a cycle if and only if it contains a minimal cycle. We stress minimality in the
results because they play a crucial role in our proofs.
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work, we assume that εi,j is ii.d. distributed according to a N(0, 1) distribution, across
all pairs of types (i, j), and also independent of the observables Zi,j. Given the utility
specification, then, we define
dijk ≡ 1(uij ≥ uik).
4.1 Estimating equations. The antiedge condition (2) implies that
Pr((ij), (kl) antiedge) ≤ (1− Pr(dilj = dlik = 1))(1− Pr(djki = dkjl = 1))
= Pr(diljdlik = 0, djkidkjl = 0).
(5)
For given parameter values β, Eq. (5) can be written as a moment inequality:
E [1((ij), (kl) antiedge)− Pr(diljdlik = 0, djkidkjl = 0;β))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
gijkl(Xt;β)
≤ 0. (6)
The identified set is defined as
B0 = {β : Egijkl(Xt; β) ≤ 0, ∀i, j, k, l} .
These moment inequalities are quite distinct from other types of inequalities consid-
ered in the existing empirical matching literature. A number of papers in this literature
(including Choo and Siow (2006), Dagsvik (2000), Fox (2007)) use inequalities similar to
those in the multinomial choice literature, that each observed pair (i, j) represents, for
both i and j, an “optimal choice” from some “choice set”. The restrictions in (2) cannot
be expressed in such a way.
Assume that we observe multiple aggregate matchings. Let T be the number of such
observations, and Xt denote the t-th aggregate matching that we observe. Then the
sample analog of the expectation in (6) is
1
T
∑
t
1((ij), (kl) is antiedge in Xt)− Pr(diljdlik = 0, djkidkjl = 0;β)
=
1
T
∑
t
gijkl(Xt; β).
(7)
If the number of types of men and woman were equal (M = W ), then there would
be W
2∗(W−1)2
2
such inequalities, corresponding to each couple of pairs. Note that the
expectation E above is over both the utility shocks ε’s, as well as over the “equilibrium
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selection” process (which we are agnostic about).
There is by now a large methodological literature on estimating confidence sets for
parameters in partially identified moment inequality models that cover the identified set
B0 with some prescribed probability. (An incomplete list includes Chernozhukov, Hong,
and Tamer (2007), Andrews, Berry, and Jia (2004), Romano and Shaikh (2009), Pakes,
Porter, Ho, and Ishii (2007).) While there are a variety of objective functions one could
use, we use here the simple sum of squares objective:
Bn = argminβQn(β) =
∑
i,j,k,l
[
1
T
T∑
t=1
gijkl(Xt; β)
]2
+
where [x]+ denotes x ∗ 1(x > 0).
4.2 Relaxing the stability constraints. Stability (rationalizability) places very strong
demands on the data that can be observed. The condition in Theorem 7 will very often be
violated by aggregate matchings with many non-zero elements. We propose a relaxation
of the stability constraint that is particularly useful in applied empirical work.
We assume that blocking pairs may not necessarily form. So if preferences are such
that the pair (m,w) would block X, the block only actually occurs with probability less
than 1. The reason for not blocking could be simply the failure of m and w to meet or
communicate (as in the literature on search and matching).
Specifically, we allow for the possibility that an observed edge between pairs (i, j)
and (k, l) may imply nothing about the preferences of the affected types i, j, k, l, simply
because the couples (i, j) and (k, l) fail to meet. In particular, define
δijkl = P (types (i, j), (k, l) communicate).
We then modify the stability inequalities (2) as:(
(ij), (kl) is anti-edge
(ij), (kl) meet
)
⇒
{
diljdlik = 0
djkidkjl = 0
(8)
This leads to the modified moment inequality:
Pr((ij), (kl) antiedge) ≤ Pr(diljdlik = 0, djkidkjl = 0;β)
δijkl
(9)
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Note that as δijkl → 1, we expect that the identified set B0 shrinks to the empty set.
The reason is that most aggregate matchings violate the condition in Theorem 7; thus
they cannot be rationalized without a positive probability that potential blocking pairs
do not form. On the other hand, as δijkl → 0, the identified set converges to the whole
parameter space: the right-hand side of the moment inequality becomes larger than 1.
Here, we are assuming that the events ((ij), (kl) is an edge) and ((ij), (kl) meet) are
independent events. The first event depends on preferences and process that produces a
stable matching in the first place. So we are making the assumption that the probability
of communication is independent of preferences and the matching.5
In our empirical work, we allow δijkl to depend on the relative number of matched (i, j)
and (k, l) couples in each observation. Specifically, letting γ denote a scaling parameter,
we set
δtijkl = min{ 2 · γ ·
|XTMi ,TWj |
|Xt| ·
|XTM
k
,TW
l
|
|Xt| , 1 }
where |XTMi ,TWj | denotes the number of type i men (type j women) married to a type
j woman (type i man) in observation t, and |Xt| denote the number of observed men
(women) in observation t.
To interpret this, consider a given pair of couples (i, j), (k, l). If this couple constitutes
an antiedge, and the stability conditions fails, then two potential blocking pairs can be
formed: (i, l) and (k, j). The specification for δtijkl represents one story for when a
blocking pair which is present in the agents’ preferences, actually blocks. With |XTMi ,TWj |
(resp. |XTM
k
,TW
l
|) being the number of (i, j) (resp. (k, j)) couples, and |Xt|2 being the
total number of potential couples in the entire market, then δtijkl is set proportional to
the frequency of potential blocking pairs (j, l), (k, j) in the market; it is scaled by γ (and
capped from above by 1). We scale by γ to allow the probability that a blocking pair
forms to be smaller or larger than this frequency, with a larger γ implying that blocking
pairs form more frequently, so that there is less slackness in the stability restrictions.
More broadly, the δ’s weight the anti-edges in the sample moment inequalities. In-
tuitively, an antiedge ((i, j), (l, k)) should receive a higher weight when it involves many
potential blocking pairs than when it only involves a few. Our specification achieves this
5We could relax this assumption by making δ dependent on the same covariates that enter into the
agents preferences.
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idea, as it makes the probability of forming a blocking pair dependent on the number of
agents involved.
4.3 Individual-level heterogeneity: remarks. We have assumed that agents who
are of the same type have identical preferences. A different starting point is to assume
(as most of the empirical literature has assumed) that individuals of the same type have
the same preferences up to individual-specific i.i.d. shocks: for example see Choo and
Siow (2006) and Galichon and Salanie (2009) in the TU model, and Dagsvik (2000) for
the NTU model. In this section, we compare our empirical approach with the approach
taken in these papers, especially with respect to the role of individual-level heterogeneity.
Note that the i.i.d. assumption allows two (say) type i men to differ in the utility they
would obtain from a matching with a (say) type j woman. However, each of these men
still remains indifferent between all type j women.6 Thus the unobserved heterogeneity
is limited, as two agents of the same type are still perceived as identical by the opposite
side of the market. Put differently, under the i.i.d. assumption, individual-level preference
shocks only perturb agents’ preferences among their potential partners’ types, but do not
affect how they are perceived by their potential partners.
In the papers cited previously, individual-level preference shocks are added so that
each agent type ends up with a non-zero probability of being matched with any agent
type on the opposite side of the market, in order to better reconcile the theory to the
observed data. In this respect, the role of the preference shocks in these papers plays the
same role as the “communication probability” δijkl in our empirical analysis. Our results
on aggregate matchings (especially Theorems 7 and 10) imply that many of the observed
marriages in the data would be labeled “blocking pairs” which would make the observed
matchings unstable; by introducing the communication probability, we transform the
either-or notion of a blocking pair to a probabilistic notion, which allows us to rationalize
the observed matchings.
Moreover, it turns out that i.i.d. preference shocks have no aggregate implications on
the moment restrictions implied by stability. Specifically, with i.i.d. preference shocks,
stability leads to vacuous empirical implications, which are trivially satisfied. To see
this, we consider a simplified problem where every woman (man) is acceptable to all men
6Galichon and Salanie (2009) also discuss this point (cf. pg. 10).
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(women), and work from the stability inequalities: for all pairs (i, j):
∑
k:k>ij
xi,k +
∑
k:k>ji
xk,j + xi,j ≥ 1.
Here, k >i j means that i prefers k over j, and k >j i means that j prefers k over i.
Letting dikj = 1k>ij, this can be written as:∑
k
xi,kdikj +
∑
k
xk,jdjki + xi,j ≥ 1. (10)
Here (i, j, k) all denote individual agents, not types. These inequalities cannot be taken
directly to the data, because we do not observe the individual-level matching, but rather
an aggregate-level matching.
One starting point is to treat both the x’s and the d’s as random variables, where the
randomness derives from both the individual-level preference shocks, as well as from the
procedure whereby the observed matching is selected among the set of stable matchings.
We partition the men and women into types tM1 , . . . t
M
L t
W
1 , . . . t
W
L . Since individual-level
preference shocks are i.i.d. we obtain that
P (dijk = 1) = P (di′j′k′ = 1) : ∀(i, i′) ∈ tMi , (j, j′) ∈ tMj , (k, k′) ∈ tMk . (11)
That is, the distribution of dijk is identical for all individuals of the same type. Hence,
below we will use the notation P (dijk = 1) and P (t
W
j >tMi t
W
k ) interchangeably.
Given these assumptions, we can derive an aggregate version of Eq. (10). First, we
take expectations:∑
k
E [xi,kdikj] +
∑
k
E [xk,jdjki] + E [xi,j] ≥ 1
⇔
∑
k
x¯i,k,j · P (dikj = 1) +
∑
k
x¯k,j,i · P (djki = 1) + E [xi,j] ≥ 1
with x¯i,k,j ≡ E [xi,kdikj|dikj = 1]. Next, we aggregate up to the type-level:∑
l
{
P
{
tWl >tMi t
W
j
}
X¯tMi ,tWl ,tWj
}
+
∑
l
{
P
{
tMl >tWj t
M
i
}
X¯tM
l
,tWj ,t
M
i
}
≥ ∣∣tWj ∣∣ ∣∣tMi ∣∣ (1−E[Xi,j])
(12)
Here X¯tMi ,tWl ,tWj ≡
∑
k∈tW
l
∑
i∈tMi
∑
j∈tWj
X¯i,k,j and X¯tM
l
,tWj ,t
M
i
≡∑j∈tMi ∑j∈tWj ∑i∈tMi X¯k,j,i.
In the above inequality, only the
∣∣tWj ∣∣ and ∣∣tMi ∣∣ are observed, but nothing else. This is of
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little use empirically.
On the other hand, because dijk ≥ 0, for all (i, j, k), we also have
E(Xikdikj) =E(Xikdikj|dikj = 1)P (dikj = 1) ≤ E(Xik)
⇒
∑
k∈tW
l
E(Xikdikj|dikj = 1)P (dikj = 1) ≤
∑
k∈tW
l
E(Xik)
⇔P (tWl >i j)
∑
k∈tW
l
X¯ikj ≤
∑
k∈tW
l
E(Xik)
⇒
∑
i∈tMi
P (tWl >i j)
∑
k∈tW
l
X¯ikj ≤
∑
i∈tMi
∑
k∈tW
l
E(Xik)
⇔P (tWl >tMi j)
∑
i∈tMi
∑
k∈tW
l
X¯ikj ≤ XtMi ,tWl
⇒P (tWl >tMi tWj )
∑
j∈tWj
∑
i∈tMi
∑
k∈tW
l
X˜ikj ≤
∣∣tWj ∣∣XtMi ,tWl
⇔P (tWl >tMi tWj )X¯tMi ,tWl ,tMj ≤
∣∣tWj ∣∣XtMi ,tWl
(13)
Combining inequalities (12) and (13), we get
∑
l
∣∣tWj ∣∣XtMi ,tWl +∑
l
∣∣tMi ∣∣XtMl ,tWj ≥ ∣∣tWj ∣∣ ∣∣tMi ∣∣ (1− E[Xi,j])
By the equalities
∑
lXtMi ,tWl =
∣∣tMi ∣∣ and ∑lXtMl ,tWj = ∣∣tWj ∣∣, the above reduces to
2
∣∣tMi ∣∣ ∣∣tWj ∣∣ ≥ ∣∣tMi ∣∣ ∣∣tWj ∣∣ (1− E[Xij) ⇒ 2 ≥ (1− E[Xij)
which is vacuous.
In summary, then, i.i.d. individual-level preference shocks seem inappropriate in the
aggregate NTU setting of our empirical work. Furthermore, the communication proba-
bility δijkl plays a similar role in our empirical work as do preference shocks in others’
work: namely, to better reconcile the theory to the data by enlarging the the sets of
marriages which one could observe in a stable matching.
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5 Estimation results
5.1 Data and empirical implementation. In the empirical implementation, we use
data on new marriages, as recorded by the US Bureau of Vital Statistics. We consider
new marriages in the year 1988, and treat data from each state as a separate, indepen-
dent matching. We aggregate the matchings into age categories, and create canonical
matchings. Table 1 has examples of aggregate matchings, and the corresponding canoni-
cal matchings, for several states. In these matching matrices, rows denote age categories
for the husbands, and the columns denote the age categories for the wives.
Table 1: Aggregate Matchings and the corresponding Canonical Matchings.
Age: Aggregate Matchings Canonical Matchings
|↓, ~→ 12-20 21-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-50 51-94 12-20 21-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-50 51-94
12-20 231 47 8 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
21-25 329 798 156 32 11 7 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
26-30 71 477 443 136 27 8 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
MI 31-35 11 148 249 196 83 21 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
36-40 2 41 105 144 114 51 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
41-50 0 15 42 118 121 162 25 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
51-94 0 2 11 11 35 137 158 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
12-20 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
21-25 17 31 4 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
26-30 2 21 22 7 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
NV 31-35 0 4 10 5 3 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
36-40 0 3 8 2 2 2 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
41-50 0 1 1 2 6 3 3 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
51-94 0 0 0 0 0 5 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
12-20 307 83 12 6 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
21-25 453 1165 214 64 10 6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
26-30 113 698 703 190 51 17 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
PA 31-35 17 184 393 277 78 26 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
36-40 9 73 152 191 148 84 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
41-50 3 27 83 146 187 273 28 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
51-94 1 7 12 38 48 182 268 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
These aggregate canonical matchings have many 1’s. Indeed it is apparent from simply
eye-balling the table that the rationalizability condition in Theorem 7 is violated: the
matchings for all three of these states contain more than two connected cycles, implying
that they are not rationalizable. For example, consider the following submatrix for
Michigan:
|↓, ~→ 12-20 21-25 26-30
12-20 1 1 1
21-25 1 1 1
26-30 1 1 1
which has two connected cycles. As a consequence of the non-rationalizability of these
matchings, we use the approach in Section 4.2 to relax the requirements of stability.
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Finally, one feature of the table is relevant for the discussion below. Note that the
matchings in Table 1 contain more non-zero entries below the diagonal, which means
that in a preponderance of marriages, the husband is older than the wife.
In our empirical exercise, the specification of utility (Eq. (4)) is very simple, and it
only involves the ages of the two partners to a match. Suppose that man m of age Agem
is matched to woman w of age Agew. The following utility functions capture preferences
over age differences, and partner’s age.
Utilitym = β1|Agem − Agew|− + β2|Agem − Agew|+ + εm
Utilityw = β3|Agem − Agew|− + β4|Agem − Agew|+ + εw,
where εm and εw are assumed to follow a standard normal distributions. In this spec-
ification, we assume that utility is a piecewise-linear function of age, with the “kink”
occurring when the age-gap between husband and wife is zero.
The sample moment inequality (Eq. (7)), with the modification in Eq. (8), becomes:
1
T
∑
t
gijkl(Xt; β) =
( 1
T
∑
t
1((ij), (kl) is antiedge in Xt) ∗ δtijkl
)
− (1− Pr(dilj = 1;β1,2)Pr(dlik = 1;β3,4))(1− Pr(djki = 1;β3,4)Pr(dkjl = 1;β1,2))
for all combinations of pairs, (i, j) and (k, l).
5.2 Component-wise identified sets. Table 2 summarizes the identified set for sev-
eral levels of γ, and presents the highest and lowest values that each parameter attains
in the identified set. The unrestricted interval in which we searched for each parame-
ter was [−2, 2]. So we see that, for a value of γ = 27, the identified set contains the
full parameter space, implying that the data impose no restrictions on parameters. At
the other extreme, when γ ≥ 36, the identified set becomes empty, implying that the
observed matchings can no longer be rationalized. The latter is consistent with our dis-
cussion above, where we noted that when the communication probability δ becomes very
large (which is the case when γ is large), then the observed matchings will violate the
rationalizability conditions in Theorem 7.
For γ = 35, we see that β1 and β3 take negative values, while the values of β2 and
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Table 2: Unconditional Bounds of β.
β1 β2 β3 β4
γ min max min max min max min max
27 -2.00 2.00 -2.00 2.00 -2.00 2.00 -2.00 2.00
30 -2.00 2.00 -2.00 2.00 -2.00 2.00 -2.00 2.00
33 -2.00 0.25 -2.00 1.75 -2.00 0.25 -2.00 1.50
35 -2.00 -0.75 -2.00 1.00 -2.00 -0.75 -2.00 0.75
β4 tend to take negative values but also contain small positive values. This suggests
that husbands’ utilities are decreasing in the wife’s age when the wife is older, but when
the wife is younger, his utility is less responsive to the wife’s age. A similar picture
emerges for wives’ utilities, which are increasing in the husband’s age when the husband
is younger, but when the husband is older, the wife’s utility is less responsive to her
husband’s age. All in all, our findings here support the conclusion that husbands’ and
wives’ utilities are more responsive to the partner’s age when the wife is older than the
husband.
5.3 Joint identified sets. A richer picture emerges when we consider the joint values
of parameters in the identified set. Figure 1 illustrates the contour sets (at different
values of γ) for the husband’s preference parameters (β1, β2), holding the wife’s preference
parameters (β3, β4) fixed. To simplify the interpretation of these findings in light of the
stability restrictions, we recall two features of our aggregate matchings (as seen in Table
1): first, there are more anti-edges below the diagonal, where agem > agew. Second, there
are more “downward-sloping” anti-edges than “upward-sloping” ones. That is, there are
more anti-edges (i, j), (k, l) with k > i, l > j than with k < i, l < j, as illustrated here.
Downward-sloping anti-edge:
(i, j)
GG
GG
GG
GG
(i, l)
(k, j) (k, l)
Upward-sloping anti-edge:
(k, j) (k, l)
(i, j)
wwwwwwww
(i, l)
Because of these features, we initially focus on the parameters (β2, β4), which describe
preferences when the husband is older than the wife.
The graphs in the bottom row of Figure 1 correspond to β4 = −2, corresponding to
the case that the wife prefers a younger husband: with a downward-sloping anti-edge,
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Figure 1: Identified sets of (β1, β2) given (β3, β4) and γ.
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this implies that it is likely that djik = 1 and dlki = 0. In turn, using the stability
restrictions (2), this implies that dilj = 0 (that husbands prefer younger wives), but
places no restrictions on the sign of dkjl. For this reason, we find that in these graphs,
β2 tends to take positive values at the highest contour levels so that, when husbands are
older than their wives, they prefer the age gap to be as large as possible.
By a similar reasoning, β2 takes negative values when β4 = 1. When wives prefer older
husbands (which is the case when β4 = 1), then with a downward-sloping anti-edge, this
implies that djik = 0 and dlki = 1. Consequently, stability considerations would restrict
the husband’s preferences so that dkjl = 0 (and husbands prefer older wives), leading to
β2 < 0.
On the other hand, because there are more matchings below the diagonal, when the
wife is older than the husband, restriction (2) implies that one of two cases – either
the husband prefers a younger wife, or the wife prefers an older husband – must be
true. In Figure 1, as β3 increases from −2 to 1 (from the left to the right column), the
wife’s utilities becomes more favorable towards a younger husband. As a result, fewer
restrictions are imposed to the husbands’ utilities, which yields a tighter range for β1 in
the identified sets.
Overall, we see that β1 < 0 and β3 < 0, implying that as long as the wife is older than
the husband, both prefer a smaller age gap. On the other hand, β2 and β4 are negatively
correlated: as β4 increases, β2 decreases. This suggests that, when the husband is older
than the wife, one side prefers a smaller gap but the other side is less responsive on the
age gap.
5.4 Confidence sets. Figure 2 summarizes the 95% confidence sets with γ = 32 (in
light blue) and 35 (dark blue). In computing these confidence sets, we use the subsam-
pling algorithm proposed by Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007). Comparing the
confidence sets in Figure 2 to their counterpart identified sets in Figure 1, the confidence
sets are apparently larger than the identified sets. This is not surprising, given the mod-
est number of matchings (fifty-one: one for each state) which we used in the empirical
exercise.
Nevertheless, the main findings from Figure 1 are still apparent; β1 < 0 across a range
of values for (β3, β4), and β2 < 0 (resp. > 0) when β4 > 0 (resp. < 0). These somewhat
“antipodal” preferences between a husband and wife are a distinctive consequence of the
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stability conditions of the matching model, in a non-transferable utility setting.
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Figure 2: 95% confidence sets of (β1, β2) given (β3, β4) and γ = 32 (light blue) and 35
(dark blue).
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6 Conclusions
We have characterized the full observable implications of stability for aggregate match-
ings: with transfers and without them. The implications are easy to check, and strongly
restrict the data. We have developed an econometric procedure for estimating preference
parameters from aggregate data; our procedure is based on moment inequalities derived
from the stability restrictions.
We focused on aggregate matching data because it seems that often data come in an
aggregate form, and because many applied researchers have already looked at aggregate
matchings. More broadly, though, the idea of stability is akin to the absence of arbitrage,
and as such it is a very weak notion of equilibrium for a market; thus, our emphasis on
stability represents an attempt to derive results for matching markets which are robust
to the exact matching process, which we remain agnostic about.
An alternative approach would have been to specify a detailed structural model of
how agents match, and estimate this model by traditional means. This would have some
clear advantages. One could empirically back out some of the details involved in how a
matching is produced, and understand the source of frictions that may prevent a market
from reaching a fully stable matching. On the other hand, it would also require very
strong assumptions about how agents act, and on the technology involved in matching,
and one worries that the estimation results may be unrobust if these assumptions were
wrong. Our focus on stability avoids these problems, and the results here show that
it is enough to yield nontrivial empirical implications which can be used for estimating
preference parameters.
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Appendix A Examples
Example 12. The following example shows that two maximal stable matchings may have
a different number of non-zero entries.
>m1 >m2 >m3 >w1 >w2 >w3
w3 w2 w3 m2 m3 m3
w2 w1 w1 m1 m2 m1
w1 w3 w2 m3 m1 m2
1
NNN
NNN
NNN
NNN
NN 1
==
==
==
= 1
1

1 1
1
pppppppppppppp

1


1
Then both X and X ′ are maximal stable matchings:
X =

 0 0 11 1 1
0 0 1


X ′ =

 1 1 00 1 0
1 1 1


The following example is rationalizable using many different preference profiles. The
algorithm used in the proof of Theorem 7 can only construct some of them.
Example 13. Consider the following aggregate matching.
X =


1 1 1 0
1 0 0 1
0 0 0 1
1 0 1 0


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We illustrate the algorithm used in the proof of Theorem 7.
There is a minimal cycle, {(i1, j1), (i4, j1), (i4, j3), (i1, j3)}.
I¯1 = {i1, i4}, J¯1 = {j1, j3}
I¯2 = {i2}, J¯2 = {j2}
I¯3 = ∅, J¯3 = {j4}
I¯4 = {i3}, J¯4 = ∅
All orientations labeled (1) are determined by the minimal cycle. The orientations
denoted (2), (3), and (4) are determined as we apply the algorithm.
j1 j3 j2 j4
i1 1
(2)

(2)
++
(1)

1
(2)
//
(1)
oo 1 0
i4 1
(2)

(1) // 1
(1)
OO
0 0
i2 1
(3)
,,0 0 1
(4)

i3 0 0 0 1
Appendix B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Theorem 7.. We first record a simple fact about minimal cycles:
Lemma 14. If c = 〈x0, . . . , xN〉 is a minimal cycle, then no vertex appears twice in c.
B.1.1 Proof of necessity. We break up the proof into a collection of simple lemmas.
An orientation of (V, L) is a mapping d : L → {0, 1}. We shall often write
d((i, j), (i, k)) as di,j,k and d((i, j), (l, j)) as dj,i,l. A preference profile (>mi , >wj) defines
an orientation d by setting dj,i,l = 1 iff mi >wj ml and di,j,k = 1 iff wj >mi wk.
29
Let d be an orientation defined from a preference profile. Then X is stable if and
only if, for all (i1, j1) and (i2, j2), if Xi1j1 = Xi2j2 = 1 then
di1j2j1dj2i1i2 = 0 and di2j1j2dj1i2i1 = 0. (14)
We say that the pair ((i1, j1), (i2, j2)) is an antiedge if i1 6= i2, j1 6= j2 and Xi1j1 =
Xi2j2 = 1.
Fix an orientation d of (V, L). A path {(i, j)n : n = 0, . . . , N} is a flow for d if
either d((i, j)n, (i, j)n+1) = 1 for all n ∈ {0, . . . N − 1}, or d((i, j)n, (i, j)n+1) = 0 for all
n ∈ {0, . . . N − 1}. If the second statement is true, we call the path a forward flow .
Our first observation is an obvious consequence of the property of being minimal:
Lemma 15. Let {(i, j)n : n = 0, . . . , N} be a minimal path with N ≥ 2, then for any
n ∈ {0, . . . N − 2},
(in = in+1 ⇒ jn+1 = jn+2) and (jn = jn+1 ⇒ in+1 = in+2)
That is, any two subsequent edges in a path must be at a right angle:
1 1 1
1
1 1 1
1
The path on the left is not minimal; the path on the right is.
Fix an orientation d derived from the preferences rationalizing X.
Lemma 16. Let p = 〈(i, j)n : n = 0, . . . , N〉 be a minimal path. If d((i, j)1, (i, j)0) = 1
or d((i, j)N , (i, j)N−1) = 0, then p is a flow for d.
Proof. By Lemma 15, for any n ∈ {1, . . . N − 1} the pair of vertices (i, j)n−1 and (i, j)n+1
form an antiedge: we have X(i,j)n−1 = X(i,j)n+1 = 1, in−1 6= in+1 and jn−1 6= jn+1. Further,
(i, j)n has one element in common with (i, j)n−1 and the other in common with (i, j)n+1.
Thus by Equation 14, d((i, j)n, (i, j)n−1) = 1 implies that d((i, j)n, (i, j)n+1) = 0, i.e.
d((i, j)n+1, (i, j)n) = 1.
The argument in the previous paragraph shows that the existence of some n′ with
d((i, j)n′ , (i, j)n′−1) = 1 implies d((i, j)n, (i, j)n−1) = 1 for all n ≥ n′. So if d((i, j)1, (i, j)0) =
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1 then d((i, j)n+1, (i, j)n) = 1 for all n ∈ {1, . . . N − 1}; and if d((i, j)N , (i, j)N−1) = 0,
then d((i, j)n+1, (i, j)n) = 0 for all n ∈ {0, . . . N − 1}. Either way, p is a flow.
As an immediate consequence of Lemma 16, we obtain the following
Lemma 17. Let p = 〈(i, j)n〉 be a minimal cycle, then p is a flow for d.
Let p = 〈(i, j)n〉 be a path and (i, j) /∈ p. A path p¯ = 〈(¯i, j¯)n : n = 0, . . . , N¯〉 connects
p and (i, j) if (¯i, j¯)0 ∈ p and (¯i, j¯)N = (i, j).
Lemma 18. Let c = 〈(i, j)n〉 be a minimal cycle, and p = 〈(¯i, j¯)n : n = 0, . . . , N¯〉 be a
minimal path connecting c to some (¯i, j¯). Then 〈(¯i, j¯)n : n = 1, . . . , N¯〉 is a forward flow.
Proof. Let c = 〈(i, j)n : n = 0, . . . , N〉 be the cycle in the hypothesis of the lemma. We
write (i, j)n for (i, j)n mod (N), so we can index the cycle by any positive integer index. By
Lemma 17, c is a flow for d: we can in fact suppose that it is a forward flow, otherwise,
if d((i, j)1, (i, j)0) = 0, then we can re-index by setting (i, j)k = (i, j)N−k.
To prove Lemma 18 we need to deal with two different cases. Let (i, j)n∗ = (¯i, j¯)0. By
definition of a cycle, then, (¯i, j¯)0 shares either i or j with (i, j)n∗−1. Suppose, without loss
of generality, that they share i, so i¯0 = in∗−1. The two cases in question are represented
below, where the center vertex is (¯i, j¯)0. Case 1 on the left has (¯i, j¯)1 also sharing i with
(¯i, j¯)0, while Case 2 has (¯i, j¯)0 sharing j with (¯i, j¯)1.
1
1 // 1
OO
1
1
1
1 // 1
OO
1
1
Case 1: Suppose that i¯1 = i¯0 = in∗−1. Consider the minimal path
p′ = 〈(i, j)n∗−1, (¯i, j¯)1, . . . , (¯i, j¯)N¯〉.
Since in∗−2 6= i¯1, the path
pˆ = 〈(i, j)n∗−2, (i, j)n∗−1, (i, j)1〉
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is a minimal path from (i, j)n∗−2 to (i, j)1. We have that d((i, j)n∗−1, (i, j)n∗−2) = 1, as
c is a forward flow. It follows by Lemma 16 that d((¯i, j¯)1, (i, j)n∗−1) = 1 and thus pˆ
is also a forward flow. Then, by Lemma 16 again, p′ is a forward flow; in particular,
d((¯i, j¯)n+1, (¯i, j¯)n) = 1 for n ∈
{
1, . . . N¯ − 1}.
Case 2: Suppose that i¯1 6= i¯0 = in∗−1. Then the path
〈(i, j)n∗−1, (¯i, j¯)0, (¯i, j¯)1〉
is a minimal path connecting (i, j)n∗−1 and (¯i, j¯)1.
We have that d((i, j)n∗−1, (i, j)n∗−2) = 1, as c is a forward flow. By an application of
Lemma 16, analogous to the one in Case 1, we obtain that p is a forward flow.
Regardless of whether we are in Case 1 or 2 we establish that 〈(¯i, j¯)n : n = 1, . . . , N¯〉
is a forward flow.
Lemma 19. There are no two connected distinct minimal cycles.
Proof. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there are two minimal cycles c1 and c2,
and a path p = 〈(i, j)n : n = 0, . . . , N〉 connecting (i, j)0 ∈ c1 with (i, j)N ∈ c2. We can
suppose without loss of generality that p is minimal. We can also suppose that N ≥ 3
because if N < 3 we can add (i′, j′) ∈ c1 to p with ((i′, j′), (i, j)0) ∈ L, and (i′′, j′′) ∈ c2
to p with ((i′′, j′′), (i, j)N) ∈ L; the corresponding path will also be a minimal path
connecting c1 and c2.
By Lemma 18 applied to c1 and p,
〈(i, j)n : n = 1, . . . N〉
is a forward flow. On the other hand, Lemma 18 applied to c2 and p implies that
〈(i, j)N−k : k = 1, . . . N〉
is a forward flow. The first statement implies that d((i, j)2, (i, j)1) = 1 and the second
that d((i, j)1, (i, j)2) = 1, a contradiction.
B.1.2 Proof of sufficiency. To prove sufficiency, we explicitly construct an orientation d
that satisfies Equation 14. We then show that there is a rationalizing preference profile.
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We first deal with the case where all vertices in X are connected and there is at most
one minimal cycle. By decomposing an arbitrary X into connected components, we shall
later generalize the argument. If there is no cycle in X, choose a singleton vertex and
treat it as the “cycle” in the sequel.
Let C be the submatrix having the indices in the minimal cycle. If c = 〈(i, j)n〉 is the
minimal cycle, let I1 = ∪n {in} and J1 = ∪n {jn}. Then C is the matrix (xi′,j′)(i′,j′)∈I1×J1 .
Thus C contains the minimal cycle.
We re-arrange the indices of X to obtain a matrix of the form:
(J1) (J2) (J3)
(I1) C X1 O · · ·
(I2) Y1 O X2 · · ·
(I3) O Y2 O · · ·
...
...
...
(15)
We define the submatrices Xn and Yn by induction. For n ≥ 1, let
In+1 = {i /∈ ∪n1Ik|∃j ∈ ∪n1Jk s.t. (i, j) ∈ V }
Jn+1 = {j /∈ ∪n1Jk|∃i ∈ ∪n1Ik s.t. (i, j) ∈ V }
Now, letXn be the matrix (xi′,j′)(i′,j′)∈In×Jn+1 and Yn be the matrix (xi′,j′)(i′,j′)∈In+1×Jn .
Finally, re-label the indices such that if i ∈ In and i′ ∈ In′ and n < n′ then i < i′. The
numbering of indexes in In is otherwise arbitrary. Re-label j’s in a similar fashion.
For every i ∈ In there is a k < n and j ∈ Jk such that (i, j) ∈ V , and similarly, for
every j ∈ Jn there is a k < n and i ∈ Ik such that (i, j) ∈ V . Thus, for i ∈ In there is a
sequence
(i, jk0), (ik1 , jk0), . . . (ikN , jkN′ ),
with N = N ′ + 1 or N ′ = N − 1, which defines a path connecting (i, jk0) to the cycle c.
Similarly, if j ∈ Jn there is a path connecting (ik0 , j) to c.
The observation in the previous paragraph has two consequences:
Claim 20. If i ∈ In and j ∈ Jn (n > 1), then (i, j) /∈ V .
Claim 20 is true because otherwise there would be two different paths connecting
33
(i, j) to c, one having (i, jk0) and the other (ik0 , j) as second element. Then we would
have a distinct second cycle.
Claim 21. Let i ∈ In (n > 1), and let there be two distinct j and j′ (j′ > j) such that
(i, j), (i, j′) ∈ V . Then (i′, j′) ∈ V implies that i′ ∈ In′ with n′ > n.
Claim 21 is true because otherwise we would again have two different paths connecting
(i, j′) to c; one path with (i, j) and one with (i′, j′) as its second element.
Define the orientation d as follows.
1. If (i, j) ∈ c and (i, j′) ∈ c then define di,j,j′ to be 1 if (i, j) comes immediately after
(i, j′) in c. That is, di,j,j′ = 1 if there is n such that
(i, j′) = (i, j)n mod (N) and (i, j) = (i, j)n+1 mod (N).
2. If (i, j) ∈ c and (i′, j) ∈ c then define dj,i,i′ to be 1 if (i, j) comes immediately after
(i′, j) in c.
3. If (i, j) /∈ c and (i, j′) ∈ c then define di,j,j′ to be 1.
4. If (i, j) /∈ c and (i′, j) ∈ c then define dj,i,i′ to be 1.
5. If (i, j) /∈ c and (i, j′) /∈ c then define di,j,j′ to be 1 iff j > j′.
6. If (i, j) /∈ c and (i′, j) /∈ c then define dj,i,i′ to be 1 iff i > i′.
7. If (i, j) ∈ V and (i′, j) /∈ V , then define dj,i,i′ to be 1.
Let di,j′,j = 0 when 1-7 imply that di,j,j′ = 1; similarly dj,i′,i = 0 when 1-7 imply that
dj,i,i′ = 1.
Lemma 22. If (i, j) is a vertex in c, then there is at most one j′ such that j′ 6= j and
(i, j′) ∈ c; in addition, (i, j) and (i, j′) are adjacent in c. Similarly, there is at most one
i′ 6= i such that (i′, j) ∈ c; in addition, (i, j) and (i′, j) are adjacent in c
Proof. We let the index of c range over all the integers by denoting (i, j)n mod (N) by
(i, j)n.
Let (i, j) be a vertex in c, and n > 0 be such that (i, j) = (i, j)n. Suppose there is j
′
such that j′ 6= j and (i, j′) ∈ c. If it does not exist, we are done. Since now N ≥ 2, (i, j)
is in the minimal path connecting (i, j)n−1 and (i, j)n+1. By Lemma 15, then, either
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in−1 = i or in+1 = i, and exactly one of these is true. In the first case, we can set
j′ = jn−1 and in the second we can set j
′ = jn+1. Suppose, without loss of generality,
that j′ = jn+1.
We show that there is not a j′′ 6= j, j′ with (i, j′′) ∈ c. Suppose that there is such a j′′.
Let (i, j′′) = (i, j)m. By Lemma 15, we have either m < n− 1 or m > n+ 1. When m >
n+1, the path 〈(i, j)n−1, . . . , (i, j)m〉 is not minimal because 〈(i, j)n−1, (i, j)n, (i, j)m〉 is a
proper subset connecting (i, j)n−1 and (i, j)m. Whenm < n−1, the path 〈(i, j)m, (i, j)n, (i, j)n+1〉
is not a minimal because (i, j)m and (i, j)n+1 are directly connected. Thus c is not a min-
imal cycle, a contradiction.
Lemma 23. Let (i, j) be a vertex in c. If (i, j′) ∈ V is not a vertex in c, then, for all
i′ 6= i, (i′, j′) /∈ c. Similarly, if (i′, j) ∈ V is not a vertex in c, then, for all j′ 6= j,
(i′, j′) /∈ c.
Proof. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that (i, j) ∈ c, (i′, j′) ∈ c, with i 6= i′, j 6= j′,
and (i, j′) /∈ c. Since (i, j), (i′, j′) ∈ c, there is a minimal path 〈(i, j)k : k = 0, . . . , K〉
connecting (i′, j′) to (i, j). Then, since (i, j′) /∈ c, the minimal cycle
〈(i, j)0, . . . , (i, j)K , (i, j′), (i′, j′)〉
is distinct from c and connected to c.
Lemma 24. 1. If di,j,j′ = 1 and di,j′,j′′ = 1 then di,j,j′′ = 1.
2. If dj,i,i′ = 1 and dj,i′,i′′ = 1 then dj,i,i′′ = 1.
Proof. We prove only the first statement. The second statement can be proved by similar
fashion to the following first three cases.
First, we can rule out that di,j,j′ = 1 because (i, j) ∈ c, (i, j′) ∈ c, and (i, j) comes
immediately after (i, j′) in c (case 1). To see this, note that di,j′,j′′ = 1 would imply that
either (i, j′′) ∈ c, which is not possible by Lemma 22.
Second, suppose that di,j,j′ = 1 because (i, j) /∈ c and (i, j′) ∈ c. Then di,j′,j′′ = 1
implies that (i, j′′) ∈ c. Thus di,j,j′′ = 1 by case 3.
Third, suppose that di,j,j′ = 1 because (i, j) /∈ c and (i, j′) /∈ c and j > j′. If di,j′,j′′ = 1
because (i, j′′) /∈ c and j′ > j′′ then di,j,j′′ = 1 by case 5 by the transitivity of >. On the
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other hand, if di,j′,j′′ = 1 because (i, j
′′) ∈ c then di,j,j′′ = 1 (case 3) as well. Finally, if
di,j,j′ = 1 because of Case 7 then we obtain di,j,j′′ = 1 by Case 7 as well.
Lemma 25. The orientation d satisfies (14).
Proof. Let ((i, j), (i′, j′)) be an antiedge: so (i, j), (i′, j′) ∈ V , j 6= j′ and i 6= i′. Suppose
that di,j′,j = 1. We shall prove that dj′,i,i′ = 0.
Suppose first that di,j′,j = 1 because of case 1. Then (i, j
′) ∈ c. So, if (i′, j′) /∈ c
we obtain that dj′,i,i′ = 0 by case 3. On the other hand, if (i
′, j′) ∈ c then the edges
((i, j), (i, j′)) and ((i, j′), (i′, j′)) are in c. In fact, these edges must be consecutive, or
(i, j′) will appear twice in c. Then, di,j′,j = 1 because of case 1 implies that (i, j
′) comes
immediately after (i, j) in c; the edge ((i, j′), (i′, j′)) comes after ((i, j), (i, j′)) in c, so we
obtain that dj′,i,i′ = 0 by case 1.
Suppose second that di,j′,j = 1 because of case 3. So (i, j) ∈ c and (i, j′) /∈ c. Then
i ∈ I1 because i is an index for a vertex in the minimal cycle c. Now, by Lemma 23,
there is no i˜ with (˜i, j′) ∈ c. Since (i′, j′) ∈ V we must have i′ ∈ In for n > 1. By the
labeling we adopted, then, i < i′. Hence, dj′,i′,i = 1 by case 6.
Thirdly, suppose that di,j′,j = 1 because of case 5. If i ∈ I1, there exists j′′ such that
(i, j′′) ∈ c and di,j′,j′′ = 1 because of case 3, and dj′,i′,i = 1 by the previous result. If
i ∈ In (n > 1), then we have shown in Claim 21 that (i′, j′) ∈ V implies that i′ ∈ Ik with
k > n. Hence dj′,i′,i = 1 because of Case 5.
Finally, note that we cannot have di,j′,j = 1 because of Case 7 because (i, j) ∈ V .
Given the orientation d we have constructed, define two collections of partial orders,
(>i : i ∈ I) and (>j : j ∈ J) where we say that j >i j′ when di,j,j′ = 1 and that i >j i′
when dj,i,i′ = 1. By Lemma 24, these are well-defined strict partial orders.
Now define the preferences of man i to be some complete strict extension of >i to J ,
and similarly for the women. By Lemma 25, these preferences rationalize the matching
X.
The previous construction assumed that X had one minimal cycle. If X has more
than one minimal cycle, these must not be connected in the graph. Therefor, if we
partition the graph into connected components, there will be at most one minimal cycle
in each.
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In particular, we can partition the set of vertices V of X to be V = V1 ∪ · · · ∪VN and
Vm∩Vn = ∅. All vertices in each Vn are connected, but no pair of vertices in different sets
are connected. The partition corresponds to the connected components of the graph.
Now re-label the indices of types such that the aggregate canonical matching X is a
diagonal block matrix:
X =


X1 O · · · O
O X2 · · · O
...
... · · · ...
O O · · · XN


All vertices in Vn correspond to Xn.
The previous construction, applied to each Xn separately, yields a rationalizing pref-
erence profile of each Xn. Now, extend the preferences of each man i: say that i indexes
rows in Xn, then define a partial order ≻i on J to agree with >i on the indexes of
columns of Xn, and such that any index of a column of Xn is ranked above any other in-
dex; then define i’s preferences to be any complete extension of ≻i. Women’s preferences
are defined analogously.
The resulting profile of preferences rationalizes X because if (v, v′) is an antiedge with
v, v′ ∈ Vn, for some n, then (14) is satisfied by the previous construction of preferences,
and if v and v′ are in different components of the partition of V , then (14) is satis-
fied because any agent ranks an index in their component over an index in a separate
component.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 4.
Proof. We shall first prove Statement 1. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that X is a
maximal stable matching for a preference profile ((>m)m∈M , (>w)w∈W ). Without loss of
generality, suppose that X13 = X22 = X31 = 1.
We have X32 = 0 and X is maximal. Then there is Xij = 1 s.t. ((3, 2), (i, j)) ∈ E.
We must have 3 6= i and 2 6= j so we must have (i, j) = (1, 3). Now, there are two
possibilities:
(m1 >w2 m3) ∧ (w2 >m1 w3) (16)
(m3 >w3 m1) ∧ (w3 >m3 w2) (17)
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Suppose first that (16) holds. Since X is maximal and X12 = 0, (1, 2) must be part of
an edge. By a similar reasoning to above, we must have that ((1, 2), (3, 1)) ∈ E. By (16)
we have that m1 >w2 m3 so ((1, 2), (3, 1)) ∈ E implies that m1 >w1 m3 and w1 >m1 w2.
Then, by (16), we have
w1 >m1 w2 >m1 w3.
Then m1 >w1 m3 implies that ((1, 3), (3, 1)) ∈ E which is impossible as X13 = X31 = 1.
Suppose, second, that (16) does not hold and that (17) holds. Since X is maximal
and X33 = 0, (3, 3) must be part of an edge. By a similar reasoning to above, we must
have that ((3, 3), (2, 2)) ∈ E. By (17) we have that w3 >m3 w2 so ((3, 3), (2, 2)) ∈ E
implies that m2 >w3 m3 and w3 >m2 w2. Then, by (17), we have
m2 >w3 m3 >w3 m1.
Then w3 >m2 w2 implies that ((1, 3), (2, 2)) ∈ E which is impossible as X13 = X22 = 1.
We prove Statement 2 next. Let X be an individual matching. Suppose there is (h, l)
s.t. Xhl = 1 and the submatrix X
−(hl) is not maximally stable. Clearly, since X is stable,
so is X−(hl). Since X−(hl) is not maximally stable, there is a stable (K − 1) × (L − 1)
aggregate matching X ′ that dominates X−(hl), in fact there is a stable matrix X ′ which
dominates X−(hl) and exactly one (i∗, j∗) has X ′i∗j∗ = 1 and x
−(hl)
i∗j∗ = 0.
Consider the K×L matrix xˆ that coincides with X everywhere except that Xˆi∗j∗ = 1.
Since X is maximally stable it must be that ((i∗, j∗), (h, l)) ∈ E, as the stability of X ′
ensures that there is no other pair (i, j) with ((i∗, j∗), (i, j)) ∈ E and Xˆij = 1.
Note that, for all j 6= l, Xhj = 0 implies that there is some (s, t) with s 6= h, Xst = 1
and ((s, t), (hj)) ∈ E. Additionally, since X is an individual matching, Xst = 1 implies
that also t 6= l. In a similar fashion, for all i 6= h there is (s, t) with s 6= h, t 6= l, Xst = 1
and ((s, t), (h, j)) ∈ E.
Now consider the matching X˜ that coincides with X everywhere except that X˜hl = 0
and X˜i∗j∗ = 1. Note that ∀(i, j)(X˜il = X˜hj = 0). We claim that X˜ is a stable matching:
the submatrix X˜−(hl) coincides with X ′, so there are no edges among pairs (i, j) with
i 6= h and j 6= l. As for (i, j) with i = h or j = l, we have X˜ij = 0 so they cannot be
part of an edge.
Finally, consider a maximal stable matching
ˆˆ
X that dominates X˜. Note that we prove
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that for any j 6= l, there is some (s, t) with s 6= h and t 6= l such that ((s, t), (h, j)) ∈ E
and
ˆˆ
Xst = xst = 1. Thus the stability of
ˆˆ
X requires that
ˆˆ
Xhj = 0. Similarly we get
that
ˆˆ
Xil = 0 for any i 6= h. We also have that ˆˆXi∗j∗ = 1 because ˆˆX dominates X˜.
Then ((i∗, j∗), (h, l)) ∈ E and the stability of ˆˆX implies ˆˆXhl = 0. Thus we prove that ˆˆX
satisfies the property in the statement.
B.3 Proof of Theorem 10. We prove necessity first. Let X be an aggregate matching
that is rationalizable by the matrix α. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that the graph
(V, L) associated to X has a minimal cycle c = 〈y0, . . . , yN〉.
We say that an edge ((i, j), (i′, j′)) ∈ L is vertical if j = j′ and that it is horizontal
if i = i′. Since the cycle c is minimal, a horizontal edge in c must be followed by a vertical
edge; and a vertical edge in c must be followed by a horizontal edge (Lemma 15). Thus
c has an even number of vertices. Since y0 = yN , this implies that N is an even number.
Consider the aggregate matching X ′, which coincides with X on all entries except the
ones in c. For the entries that are vertices in c, let
X ′y2n−1 = Xy2n−1 + 1, n = 1, . . . ,
N
2
X ′y2n = Xy2n − 1, n = 0, . . . , N2 − 1
Fix a row i of X ′. For each column j, if yn = (i, j) for some n, then (modulo N)
either yn−1 or yn+1 share the same j. Without loss of generality, say that yn+1 shares the
same j. By definition of X ′, then Xyn +Xyn+1 = X
′
yn
+X ′yn+1 . Thus
∑
j X
′
i,j =
∑
j Xi,j.
A similar argument implies that, for each j,
∑
iX
′
i,j =
∑
iXi,j. Hence X
′ is a feasible
aggregate matching in program (3).
Since α rationalizes X, we have that
∑
i,j αi,jXi,j >
∑
i,j αi,jX
′
i,j. Thus,∑
i,j
αi,j(X
′
i,j −Xi,j) =
∑
n=1,...,N
2
αy2n−1 −
∑
n=0,...,N
2
−1
αy2n < 0 (18)
But then we can consider the aggregate matching X ′′ defined as
X ′′y2n−1 = Xy2n−1 − 1, n = 1, . . . , N2
X ′′y2n = Xy2n + 1, n = 0, . . . ,
N
2
− 1,
on the vertices of c, and which coincides with X on all entries that are not vertexes of c.
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By the same argument we made for X ′, X ′′ is feasible in program (3).
Now, Equation (18) implies that
∑
i,j
αi,j(X
′′
i,j −Xi,j) = −
∑
n=1,...,N
2
αy2n−1 +
∑
n=0,...,N
2
−1
αy2n > 0;
a contradiction of X being rationalized by α.
Second, we prove sufficiency. Suppose that X is an aggregate matching such that the
associated graph contains no cycles. Let α be the canonical matching derived from X.
We shall prove that α rationalizes X.
Clearly,
∑
i,j αi,jXi,j =
∑
i,j Xi,j. Suppose that X
′ is an aggregate matching such that
X ′ is feasible in program (3) for X, and that
∑
i,j αi,jX
′
i,j ≥
∑
i,j Xi,j. We shall prove
that X ′ = X.
Give α as surplus matrix,
∑
i,j Xi,j is the maximal surplus that can be achieved
in Program (3). To see this, note that all pairs who are matched generate the same
value: 1 if they are a pair that is matched under Xi,j and 0 otherwise. The number
of different men is
∑
i,j Xi,j (=
∑
i
∑
j Xi,j). The number of different women is also∑
i,j Xi,j (=
∑
j
∑
iXi,j). Thus there are at most
∑
i,j Xi,j pairs that can be formed.
The maximum value in (3) obtains when all of them generate a surplus of 1. Thus we
have
∑
i,j αi,jX
′
i,j =
∑
i,j Xi,j.
As a consequence, X ′i,j = 0 when Xi,j = 0. Otherwise we would have a pair (i, j)
that are generating a surplus of 0 under α, and we cannot have
∑
i,j αi,jX
′
i,j =
∑
i,j Xi,j.
Thus X ′i,j = 0 for all (i, j) /∈ V .
We shall assume that (V, L) has exactly one connected component. When that as-
sumption fails, we can apply the argument in the sequel to each component separately.
Choose a vertex v0 in V . Since (V, L) contains no cycle, for each v ∈ V there is a
unique path connecting v0 to v in (V, L). Let η(v) be the length of the path connecting
v0 to v. We shall prove the result by induction on η(v). Specifically, we show that for
each v with maximal η, either the row or the column of v must be identical in both X
and X ′. We can then consider the submatrix that omitting that row or column, and
repeat our argument.
Specifically, define a partial order ≻ on V , such that v1 ≻ v2 if and only if v1 is on
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the unique path from v0 to v2. Then (V,≻) defines a set of maximal chains denoted as
{V1, . . . VL}. Each maximal chain has a unique vertex with highest value of η(v). The
following argument can be made for each of these chains.
Let (i, j) be a vertex with a maximal value of η(v). Since η(v) is maximal, one of the
following two cases hold.
1. there is no i′ with ((i, j), (i′, j)) ∈ L
2. there is no j′ with ((i, j), (i, j′)) ∈ L
That is, there are either no horizontal edges, or no vertical edges, incident to (i, j).
Suppose that Case 1 holds, so Xh,j = 0 for all h 6= i. Then, X ′h,j = 0 for all h 6= i,
and
∑
hXh,j =
∑
hX
′
h,j, imply that Xi,j = X
′
i,j. Thus, column j in both matrices X
′
and X coincide.
Consider the submatrices X\j and X
′
\j, obtained after eliminating column j. Then
α\j is the canonical matching of X\j; an entry of X
′
\j is 0 when the corresponding entry
of X\j is 0, and ∑
(i,h):h 6=j
αi,hX
′
i,h =
∑
(i,h):h 6=j
αi,hXi,h.
Finally, the resulting graph (V\j, L\j) contains no cycle.
Similarly, when Case 2 holds, row i of both matrices must coincide. We can then
consider the submatrices obtained after eliminating row i.
By applying the above argument to this sequence of submatrices, we will show that
X ′i,j = Xi,j for all (i, j) ∈ V . We have already shown that X ′i,j = Xi,j = 0 for all
(i, j) /∈ V . Hence X = X ′.
Appendix C Detailed Data Description
We use Marriage and Divorce Data of the National Vital Statistics System of the National
Center for Health Statistics (NCHS).7
The data are based on marriage and divorce certificates, and include all records for
States with small numbers of events and a sample of records for States with larger
7http://www.nber.org/data/marrdivo.html
41
numbers of events. Since the sample size significantly decreased from year 1989, and
NCHS stopped producing data after 1995 due to lack of funds, we use data of year 1988.
In order to produce cross-sectional marriage distributions across the states in US, we
restrict our attention to marriage samples (i) of states of the United States or District
of Columbia, (ii) in which both groom and bride reside in a same state. In 784,211,
total number of observations, 10,204 from Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, Guam, Canada,
Cuba, Mexico, or Remainder of the world are eliminated, and also samples with states
not stated are eliminated. In addition, 47,289 observations are deleted since groom and
bride are reported to reside in distinct states. In all, total sample size is 726,718.
In categorizing men and women by there types, we only used ages; although Marriage
microdata also includes variables such as education or previous marital status, there are
significant number missing observations, so we do not use other variables. Marriage age
varies from 12 to 94 for groom and from 12 to 92 for bride. Both men and women are
categorized as 7 different age groups, and the thresholds are 12-20, 21-25, 26-30, 31-35,
36-40, 41-50, and 51-94.
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